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TAX AVOIDANCE, EARNINGS MANAGEMENT,
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MECHANISM (AN EVIDENCE FROM
INDONESIA)
Abstract: The aim of this study is to determine whether tax avoidance can be used as an
instrument for companies doing earnings management in Indonesia. The study also
investigates the role of corporate governance mechanism in influencing the relation between
tax avoidance and earnings management. The research proved that the manufacturing
company in Indonesia applies tax avoidance in earning management. These results also
showed that among the three indicators of the corporate governance mechanism used only
institutional ownership is capable of reducing the effect of tax avoidance on earnings
management; while, the board of commissioners and the independent commissioner are not.
Keyword: earnings management, tax avoidance, effective tax rate, corporate governance
mechanism
JEL classification codes G39
I. BACKGROUND
The view that the tax paid by a company is the transfer of wealth from the company to
the shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Stolowy 2004) causes shareholders
encourage the management to be more aggressive to the tax which could lead to tax
avoidance practices. Tax avoidance practices may increase the company’s cash flow
and the wealth of the company that lead to increase the wealth of the shareholder.
This action is supported by financial literature-based assumption about the effects of
tax on financial decision making of a company, which states that tax avoidance
conducted by a company resulted in a transfer of wealth from the government to the
shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala 2009).
The shareholders expect the manager’s actions on their behalf to focus on income
maximization, which includes the pursuit of opportunities to reduce tax liabilities as
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long as the benefits is greater than the costs incurred. Desai and Dharmapala (2009)
propose two opinions to be taken into consideration to determine whether the tax
avoidance activities undertaken by the company are valuable to the company. The
first opinion is that there are costs that occur when companies engage in tax avoidance
activities and the second one is based on agency theory.
Based on the first opinion, a company doing tax avoidance might deal with risk
and uncertainty as that activity might be detected by tax authority that leads to
company’s loss. In this case, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) stated that the cost incurred
for the tax avoidance activities compels manager to ensure that those activities
conducted by the company are not detected as an illegal activity (unacceptable tax
avoidance) by tax authority. If it is detected, sanctions to be received can take the form
of additional tax payments, interest, penalties, and other additional payments that
can reduce the cash flow and the wealth of the shareholder, and the total number of
the sanctions might exceed the benefits that have accrued to the enterprise (Desai et
al. 2007). Therefore, the consequence to be afraid of most is the reputation damage of
the company whenever public realizes it (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).
Furthermore, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) report their second view which is based
on agency theory. According Slemrod (2004), Chen and Chu (2005), and Crocker and
Slemrod (2005), the relationship of tax avoidance activity and agency problems is
inherent in the companies owned by public. Tax avoidance activities undertaken by
the company can be used by managers to do earnings management. Earnings
management that reflects the opportunistic nature of management is an action suffering
the company. The existence of the agency problem might raise questions whether the
tax avoidance actions undertaken by the company promotes the interests of
shareholders. The application of various schemes, methods, scenarios, and tactics in
the activities of tax avoidance instead is being used as a way for management to achieve
personal interest which is not aligned with the corporate goals.
According to Desai et al. (2007) opportunistic manager prepares corporate activities
in a complex mode in order to reduce corporate taxes as well as an attempt to divert
company resources for personal purposes (including manipulate earnings for personal
gain). Desai et al. (2007) stated that following this scenario the strong tax authorities
and the qualified corporate governance can provide additional monitoring to managers;
so that, tax authorities can reduce the diversion of resources by corporate managers.
The linkage between corporate governance and tax avoidance is due to the agency
problem that affects tax avoidance activities carried out by the company. The structure
and the transactions of tax avoidance are usually very complex and secret involving
managers in such activities that might harm shareholders. The asymmetry of
information between the two led to a high chance of misuse of power of the managerial
positions in performing methods and schemes of tax avoidance. Control mechanisms
of corporate governance (corporate governance mechanisms) can be used to assist
companies in aligning the interests of the owners and the management (Hart 1995).
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The corporate governance mechanism is rules, procedures, and a clear relationship
between the parties that make decisions and the parties that control/supervise the
decision taken (Walsh and Seward 1990). Corporate governance mechanism is used
to manage, monitor, control, and reward. Corporate governance mechanism is a form
of monitoring conducted by principal to an agent in order to reduce earnings
management actions (Hart 1995).
This research focuses on the mechanisms of corporate governance related to the
owner of the company consisted of the board of commissioners, independent
commissioner, and institutional ownership as the tax paid by the company illustrates
the magnitude of the transfer from the company to the government that is directly
related to the shareholder (Desai and Dharmapala 2008). The board of commissioners
and the shareholders are responsible as they have full authority to make decisions
about how to carry out, control, and supervise upon the resources following the
corporate goals (Syakhroza 2003). The mechanism quality of the corporate governance
in general is associated with the better performance of the corporate (Aman and
Nguyen 2008). Oversight by the board of commissioners, independent commissioner,
and institutional ownership is a very important mechanism in aligning the interests
of the shareholders and the management.
The aim of this study was to test whether tax avoidance is a way used by companies
to do earnings management in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. Although the
aim of this study is in line with (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Phillips et al. 2003;
Holland and Jackson 2009) whose aim is to determine whether tax-related disclosures
can be used as a way to detect earnings management of a company, previous studies
have not tested yet the effect of the tax avoidance on earnings management.
Unlike previous studies, this study do not use tax account that its value is directly
stated in the financial statements as in deferred tax expense or benefit but use deferred
tax asset or deferred tax liability. This study measures the tax avoidance using the
effective tax rate which is calculated by dividing the total cost of the tax to the earnings
before tax. The study also investigates the role of the corporate governance on the
relationship between tax avoidance and earnings management.
Further discussion of this paper is organized as follows: Section II addresses
Literature review and hypothesis development. Section III discusses the methodology.
Part IV discusses the research results. Section V concludes with a conclusion.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Tax avoidance and Earnings Management
According to Scott (2009), earnings management can be predicted as a management
behavior in selecting accounting policies with specific purposes. There are two
viewpoints in understanding management earnings. First, earnings management is
seen as a form of opportunistic behavior of managers to maximize their interests.
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Second, earnings management can be understood from the perspective of efficient
contract. This study examines earnings management as a form of opportunistic
behavior of the management as one of the assumptions of agency theory.
The relationship between tax avoidance and the agency theory related to the
problems within public-owned companies was introduced by Slemrod (2004), Chen
and Chu (2005), and Crocker and Slemrod (2005). The structure and the transactions
of tax avoidance are usually very complex and secret that might lead managers to get
involved in activities that insecure the shareholders. The asymmetry information
between the two cause high opportunities of managers to do malfeasance represented
in the choices of accounting methods or policies to make tax avoidance schemes. The
act of the tax avoidance conducted by a company is used as a shield by the management
performing earnings management.
Moreover, previous studies have shown that earnings management in the
perspective of tax can use account deferred tax expense (Burgstahler et al. 2002; Phillips
et al. 2003; Holland and Jackson 2009), deferred tax assets (Bauman et al. 2001; Schrand
and Wong 2003; Frank and Rego 2006). Based on the elaboration, the hypothesis
proposed is:
H1: Tax avoidance positively affects the earnings management.
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Agency theory is used to understand the basic issues of corporate governance and
earnings management. In a organization, the separation of ownership by the principal
through agents controlling tend to cause agency conflict between principal and agent.
In the perspective of agency theory, the agent is the risk adverse that tend to be self-
centered; so that, the company’s value will rise if the owner of the company can control
the behavior of the management not to waste the resources of the company, either in
the form of unfeasible investment or in the form of shirking.
Meanwhile, Corporate Governance is a system that regulates and controls the
company expected to provide and enhance the company’s value to the shareholders
(Walsh and Seward 1990). The relationship between corporate governance and tax
avoidance is caused by tax avoidance transaction which is usually a very complex
process that allows managers to get involved in any activities that harm the
shareholders. The asymmetry information between the two cause high opportunities
of managers to do malfeasance represented in the choices of accounting methods. The
corporate governance mechanism can be used to assist a company in aligning the
interests between owners and management (Hart 1995). The corporate governance
mechanism is rules, procedures, and a clear relationship between the parties that make
decisions and the parties that control/supervise the decision taken.
This research focuses on the mechanisms of corporate governance related to the
owner of the company consisted of the board of commissioners, independent
commissioner, and institutional ownership as the tax paid by the company illustrates
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the magnitude of the transfer from the company to the government that is directly
related to the shareholder (Desai and Dharmapala 2008). Oversight by the board of
commissioners and shareholders is a very important factor in harmonizing the interests
of shareholders and management.
Board of commissioners
The board of commissioners as the organization’s top leadership has the responsibility
to direct, to control, and to monitor the use of resources in order to parallelize the
organization determined goal. In terms of corporate governance, the focus of the
discussion will always be the board of commissioners, because they have the
responsibility and full authority to make a decision about how to direct, control, and
supervision of the resource management in accordance with the company’s goals (Fama
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore, if the company has a good board of
commissioners, the company will have a good performance. This quality of this function
is the determinant to the effectiveness of the corporate governance. The Committee of
Governance Policy stated that the board of commissioners has the responsibility and
authority to control management action, and Gives suggestion to management as
necessary. The hypothesis proposed is:
H2A: The board of commissioners negatively moderates the effect of tax avoidance on
earnings management.
Independent commissioner
The effectiveness of the Board of commissioners in balancing the power of the CEO is
strongly influenced by the level of independence of the board of commissioners
(Mizruchi 1983; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Lorsch and Young 1990). Therefore, the
independent commissioner might act as a moderator in solving the dispute Among
the internal managers, to control the management policy, and to give an advice to the
management (Fama and Jensen 1983). Given that situation, the independent
commissionaire is the best position to do Controlling function in order to create good
corporate governance. In addition research conducted by Dechow et al. (1995),
Chtourou et al. (2001), Klein (2002), and Xie et al. (2003) concluded that a company
with a balanced proportion of outsider commissioner that act as an independent side
in doing the management control might influence the earnings management act. The
hypothesis proposed is:
H2B: Independent commissioner negatively moderates the relationship between tax
avoidance and earnings management.
Institutional ownership
The institutional ownership has the capability to control management by effectively
controlling the process to reduce earnings management. This capability is needed
because the institutional investors are mostly the ones who are not sophisticated easily
1936 Anne Putri, Abdul Rohman and Anis Chariri
to be fooled by the management. Therefore, the institutional investors will make-
analyzes of Reviews their investment and do an assessment of information Gathered
in order to effectively control the process. McConnel and Servaes (1990), Smith (1996),
Hartzell and Starks (2003), and Cornett et al. (2006) found the evidence that the
controlling conducted by the company and institutional investors can constrain the
manager’s behavior. The hypothesis proposed is:
H2C: Institutional ownership is negatively moderates the relationship between tax
avoidance and earnings management
Empirical research model can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Empirical Research Model
III. METHODOLOGY
Data
The population of the study was all manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian
Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2012. The samples chosen were manufacturing companies
assumed to do tax avoidance. In this study, the word allegedly doing tax avoidance is
used because Indonesia has no tax avoidance act to be issued yet that results in
undetermined criteria whether a company doing tax avoidance or not. The criteria
used for companies doing tax avoidance are referred to the research of Putri and Tanno
(2015) in which the company considered doing tax avoidance is the company whose
its ETR (Effective Tax Rate) value is under the statutory tax rates.
The sampling method applied in this study was purposive sampling method. The
sampling process was carried out in two stages. The first stage was based on the
following criteria: The Manufacturing companies that:
1. have periodically financial statements ended in December 31
2. publish the Audited Financial Statement consistently and completely from
2009 to 2012.
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3. The financial statements do not use foreign currencies
4. do not have a negative earnings before tax.
After selecting the company following the first phase, the selection of the second
stage of determining the company suspected of doing tax avoidance was conducted
by comparing the value of ETR of the company with the statutory tax rate. In 2009, the
statutory tax rate was 28%; therefore, the company suspected of doing tax avoidance
was a company that its value of ETR was lower than 28%. In 2010 to 2012, the statutory
tax rate was 25%; so the company suspected of doing tax avoidance was a company
that its ETR value is below 25%.
Variables
Tax Avoidance (TA) as independent variable: Tax avoidance is the amount of tax paid
compared with a earnings before tax value which is less than the statutory tax rate.
Tax avoidance measured by ETR (effective tax rate) which calculating by dividing the
total tax expense to income before taxes. In 2009, the statutory tax rate was 2%, while
in 2010-2012 the statutory tax rate is 25%.
Earnings Management (EM) as dependent variable: Earnings management performed
by manipulating the accruals numbers, namely discretionary accruals, which do not
affect cash directly, through a wide choice of accounting methods that can be used in
preparing financial reports. Earnings management measured by discretionary accruals.
The step to calculate discretionary accruals follow Jones (1990) and Dechow et. al (1995):
1. Determine the total accruals:
TAccit = NIit - CFOit (1)
2. Determining the value of the parameter �1, �2, �3 using the formula
TAccit/Ait-1= �1 (1/ Ait-1) + �2(�REVit/Ait-1) + �3 (PPEit/Ait-1) + �i,t (2)
3. Calculate the value of NDA (non discretionary accrual) with the formula:
NDAccit/Ait-1= �1 (1/ Ait-1) + �2 [(�REVit/Ait-1)-(�RECit/Ait-1)] + �3
(PPEit/Ait-1)+ �i,t                (3)
Parameter values �1, �2, �3 is the result of the calculation in step 2
4. Determining the value of accruals discretionary as an indicator of accrual
earnings management using the formula:
DAccit = TAit - NDAit (4)
Where : TAccit = total accrual of a company NDAit = Non discretionary
accrual
DAccit = Discretionary accrual NIit = net income
CFOit = cash flow from operation Ait-1 = total asset
REVt = total Revenue, �REVit = REVt - REVt-1
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it
 = receivable �REC
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t-1
PPE
it
 = property plan and equipmen
Corporate governance mechanism as moderating variable: The corporate governance
mechanism used in this study is related to the owner of the company consisting of the
board of commissioners, the independent commissioner, and the institutional
ownership. The board of commissioners (BOC) is the number of commissioner that is
owned by a company, measured by the total number of commissioner that is owned
by a company (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996). The independent
commissioner (IC) is the member of board of commissioner from outside of the
company, measured by the percentage of the member of the commissioner board from
outside of the company from all of the company commissioner board member (Peasnell
et al. 2000; Klein 2002). The institutional ownership (IO) is the number of share
ownerships owned by institutional investor, measured by the percentage of share
owned by institutions from all distributed company share capital (Beiner et al. 2004).
ANALYTICAL METHOD
The analytical methods used to test the hypothesis is path analysis by using WarpPLS
program version 4.0. The equation for the regression model is described as follows:
EM=�
0
TA+ �
1
BOC+ �
2
IC+ �
3
IO+ �
4
TA* �
5
BOC+ �
6
TA* �
7
IC+ �
8
TA* �
9
IO+� (5)
Where:
EM= Earnings Management TA= Tax Avoidance
BOC = board of commissioners IC = independent commissioner
IO = institutional ownership
IV. RESEARCH RESULT
The Descriptive statistics of the sample data are shown in table 1.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Keterangan  N Mean Standard Deviation
2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012
TA 80 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.08
EM 80 0.10 0.17 0.80 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.35 0.24
BOC 80 4.30 4.48 4.50 4.24 2.11 1.83 2.04 1.97
IC 80 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10
IO 80 66.94 69.67 65.33 62.56 21.17 20.00 16.10 18.03
Source: Processed data used in this article
Note:
TA: Tax avoidance EM: Earnings management
IO: Institutional Ownership IC: Independent Commissioner
BOC: Board of Commissioners
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The result of the full model test using WarpPLS 4.0 is presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Output WarpPLS 4.0
Model Fit and Quality Indices
Average path coefficient (APC) =0.171, ��= 0.010
Average R-squared (ARS) =0.185, � =0.007
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.142, � =0.022
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.394, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF)=1.316, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Tenenhaus GoF (GoF)=0.431, small >= 0.1, medium >= 0.25, large >= 0.36
Jalur Coefficients �-value
TA � EM 0.284 <0.001***
BOC*TA � EM -0.016 0.421
IC*TA � EM 0.110 0.093
IO*TA � EM -0.274 <0.001***
R2 Q2 Full Collin VIF
EM 0.185 0.185 1.102
Total Effec Coefficients �-value
TA � EM 0.284 <0.001***
BOC*TA � EM -0.016 0.421
IC*TA � EM 0.110 0.093*
IO*TA � EM -0.274 <0.001***
Effect Size Coefficients
TA � EM 0.1
BOC*TA � EM 0.003
IC*TA � EM 0.014
IO*TA � EM 0.096
Source: Processed data used in this article
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level
TA: Tax Avoidance
EM: Earnings management
BOC: Board of Commissioners
IC: Independent Commissioner
IC: Institutional Ownership
BOC * TA � EM: BOC moderates the relationship between TA and EM
KOMIND * TA � EM: IC moderates the relationship between TA and EM
INSTITUTIONS * TA � EM: IO moderates the relationship between TA and EM
The value of the output of the fit model and quality indices model is as follows;
Average path coefficient (APC) = 0171, � = 0.010, Average R-squared (ARS) = 0185, �
= 0.007, Average adjusted R-squared (AARS) = 0142, � = 0.022, Average block VIF
(AVIF) = 1.394, (acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3), Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF)
= 1.316, (acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3), and Tenenhaus GoF (GoF) = 0431 (small>
= 0.1, medium> = 0.25, large > = 0.36). The prerequisite of WarpPLS is that the value
of � for APC and ARS should be less than 0.05 (significant). The value of AVIF and
AFVIF as multicollinearity indicator must be smaller than 5, and the requirement value
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of GoF is small> = 0.1, medium> = 12:25, large> = 0:36. Referring to these provisions,
it can be concluded that this research model is fit.
The test result showed that the value of R2 of the endogenous variables is 18.5%
(EM). The research model has a predictive relevance for the value of Q2 is above 0. As
the value of the full collinearity of VIF is under 3.3, the multicollinearity in the research
model does not exist.
Hypothesis 1 states that tax avoidance positively affect earnings management.
The output WarpPLS as presented in Table 3 suggests that the values of the coefficient
path of TA ’! EM is 0.284 and significant with the value of ñ <0.001. It can be concluded
that the tax avoidance positively affect the earnings management. The explanation
suggests that the hypothesis 1 is accepted with the coefficient of determination of
0.185
Meanwhile, the hypothesis 2A states that the board of commissioners negatively
moderates (weaken) the effect of tax avoidance on earnings management. The output
of WarpPLS as presented in Table 3 suggests that the path of BOC * TA � EM has
coefficient values of -0016 and is insignificant. Although this result has a negative
coefficient path direction, the value of ñ is not significant. The analysis can be concluded
that the hypothesis 2A is rejected; the board of commissioners do not moderate the
negative relationship between tax avoidance and earnings management.
In hypothesis 2B, it is stated that the independent commissioner negatively
moderates (weaken) the effect of tax avoidance on earnings management. The output
of WarpPLS as presented in Table 3 indicates that the path of IC*TA � EM shows the
coefficient value of 0.110 and is significance at � = 0.093. Although the result is
significant to the value of � = 0.093, the coefficient is positive or moderate positively,
which means that the independent commissioner negatively moderates (weaken) the
effect of tax avoidance on earnings management. This finding does not support the
proposed hypothesis. Therefore, it can be concluded that the hypothesis 2B is rejected;
the independent commissioner does not negatively moderate (weaken) the effect of
tax avoidance on earnings management.
Furthermore, the hypothesis 2C state that the institutional ownership negatively
moderate (weaken) the effect of tax avoidance on earnings management. Based
WarpPLS output as shown Table 3, it is known that the path of coefficient IO*TA �
EM has the values of -0274 and is significant at � = 0.093. The result shows that the
institutional ownership negatively moderates (weaken) the effect of tax avoidance on
earnings management. Therefore, it can be concluded that hypothesis 3C is accepted
with coefficient of determination of 0.185.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the result and discussion presented in the previous chapters, a number of
findings related to the research hypothesis are identified, among which are:
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1. Tax avoidance positively affects earnings management. The separation of the
ownership in public company can provide an opportunity for the
management to make a method selection or accounting policy for personal
gain. Researchers prove that the various methods used by the company to
carry out tax avoidance has the main objective to do earnings management.
This result supports the research findings of Burgstahler et al. (2002), Phillips
(2003), Holland and Jackson (2009).
2. The Board of Commissioners does not negatively moderate the relationship
between tax avoidance and earnings management. Although the results
showed that the coefficient is negative, the result is not significant. The result
of this study does not support the research findings conducted by Fama
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983).
3. The Independent Commissioner does not negatively moderate the
relationship between tax avoidance and earnings management. The result of
this study does not support the research conducted by Dechow et al. (1995),
Chtourou et al. (2001), Klein (2002), and Xie et al. (2003) concluding that the
proportion of companies having board members coming from the outside of
the company can influence the actions of earnings management because they
act as an independent party to conduct supervision.
4. The institutions ownership negatively moderates (weaken) the relationship
between tax avoidance and earnings management. The result of this study
supports the research conducted by McConnel and Servaes (1990), Smith
(1996), Hartzell and Starks (2003), and Cornett et al. (2006) proving that the
control undertaken by a company and institutional investors can restrict the
behavior of the manager. Institutional ownership has the ability to control the
management through effective control to reduce earnings management as
institutional investors are sophisticated ones so they are not easily to be
manipulated by the company management. Institutional investors spend a lot
of time to do investment analysis and they get expensive information access
from other investors, so that they will do more effective control process.
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